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We study optimized monetary and fiscal feedback policy rules. The setup is a New
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1 Introduction
Policymakers use their instruments to react to economic conditions. For instance, central
banks may respond to inflation, the fiscal authorities to the state of public finances, and both
of them to real economic activity. It is nevertheless believed that the use of fiscal policy is more
complex and controversial than the use of monetary policy (see e.g. Leeper, 2010). The debate
over the use of fiscal policy has been intensified since 2009 when most European governments
embarked on the difficult task of reducing their public debts at a time of stagnant or negative
growth.1 What is the best policy reaction to economic conditions within this environment?
In this paper, we search for the best mix of monetary and fiscal policy actions in a closed
economy, when the policy role is twofold: to stabilize the economy against shocks and to
improve resource allocation by gradually reducing the public debt burden over time. In order
to do so, we welfare rank various fiscal policy instruments used jointly with nominal interest
rate policy.
Following most of the related literature (see below), we work with feedback policy rules.
In particular, we specify feedback rules for public spending, the tax rate on labor income,
the tax rate on capital income and the tax rate on consumption, when these fiscal policy
instruments are allowed to respond to a number of macroeconomic variables used as indicators,
while, at the same time, monetary policy can be used in a standard Taylor-type fashion. We
optimally choose the magnitude of feedback policy reaction to those indicators. The welfare
criterion is household’s expected discounted lifetime utility. This type of policy is known
as ”optimized” feeback policy rules (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2005, 2007, and many
others). This enables us to welfare rank alternative policies in a stochastic setup, without our
results - and, in particular, our welfare ranking of alternative policies - being driven by ad hoc
differences in feedback policy coefficients, as it happens in most of the related literature on
debt consolidation (see below). We compare two policy environments. In the first, used as a
benchmark, the authorities just stabilize the economy from exogenous shocks. In the second,
the fiscal authorities also aim at reducing the ratio of public debt to output gradually over
time, which means that now we combine shock stabilization with resource allocation policies.
The setup is a rather standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy featuring
1Even in normal times, fiscal imbalances can jeopardize the stability of the whole euro area. Hence the
arguments for the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact. After the global financial crisis of 2007 and
the sharp deterioration of public finances (in the euro area, the ratio of public debt to output was around 69%
in 2008 and increased to around 95% in 2013), in view of growing concerns about fiscal sustainability, many
countries have been forced to initiate substantial fiscal adjustments. However, the resulting spending cuts, and
in particular the reliance on tax revenue measures, are believed to cause a significant burden on real activity.
See e.g. European Commission (2013) and CESifo (2014).
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imperfect competition, Calvo-type price fixities and wage rigidities. The model is solved nu-
merically employing commonly used parameter values and fiscal data from the euro area. The
steady state solution of this model (called the status quo) serves as a point of departure to
study the implications of various policies aiming at shock stabilization and debt consolidation.
To solve for optimized policy rules, we adopt the methodology of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004, 2007), in the sense that we take a second-order approximation to both the equilbrium
conditions and the welfare criterion and, in turn, we compute the welfare-maximizing values
of feedback policy rules, and the associated social welfare, under various policy scenaria.
Our main results are as follows. First, in all cases studied, the monetary authorities should
aggressively react to inflation and the fiscal authorities should react to public debt. Also, in
all cases studied, interest rate reaction to the output gap should be smaller in magnitude than
reaction to inflation (this happens even if the policy target for output is the so-called natural
level of output). In other words, the main concern of monetary authorities should be inflation
stability rather than the real economy. On the other hand, the degree of fiscal reaction to the
output gap (the so-called fiscal activism) relative to reaction to public debt, and hence what
should be the main concern of fiscal authorities, depends crucially on the distorting effects
of each fiscal instrument used and the degree of rigidities in the labor market. The more
distorting a fiscal policy instrument is, the less it should be used for debt consolidation and
the more it should be used to support the real economy. This applies in particular to labor
taxes all the time and to capital taxes in the medium and long term. Rigidities in the labor
market provide further arguments for fiscal activism. All this means that, under optimized
rules, the final, or net, change in fiscal policy instruments is determined by the reconciliation
of two typically opposing aims: to reduce public debt and to stimulate the economy. The final,
or net, effect is a quantitative matter (see our fourth result below).
Second, when we focus on lifetime utility only, welfare differences between debt consol-
idation and no debt consolidation look to be small. However, this happens only because
short-term effects work in opposite direction from medium- and long-term effects, so that the
net, or lifetime, effects are small. In particular, the comparison of outcomes with consolidation
to outcomes without consolidation implies that, in most cases, consolidation is costly in the
short run and that these costs are not trivial. By contrast, in the medium- and long-term,
debt consolidation becomes superior across all cases and this more than offsets its short-term
costs, so that eventually lifetime, or net, utility is higher with debt consolidation.
Third, in the case of debt consolidation, the choice of fiscal policy instrument matters for
how quickly public debt should be brought down. For instance, in our baseline experiments,
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public debt reduction from 85%, which is its average value in the recent euro area data, to
the 60% target level, which is the reference level of the Maastricht Treaty, should be achieved
within 5 to 12.5 years depending on how distorting the fiscal instrument is (5 years if we
use public spending or consumption taxes, and 12.5 years if we use capital taxes). This pace
should be slower if there are labor market rigidities since, in the presence of such rigidities,
fiscal policy should be mainly concerned about the real economy. On the other hand, if we use
labor taxes, which are a particularly distorting instrument at any time, the pace of public debt
reduction should be very slow, following an almost unit root process, and this is irrespectively
of the degree of labour market rigidities.
Fourth, the choice of fiscal policy instrument matters for welfare too. If there are no
rigidities in the labor market, the concern for public debt should dominate the concern for
output and, in this case, it is better to use public spending along with interest rate policy.
Practically, this means that, if there are no labor market rigidities, the best fiscal policy action
is to cut public spending initially so as to bring public debt down. On the other hand, if
there are rigidities in the labor market, the concern for output should dominate the concern
for public debt and, in this case, it is better to use income (labor or capital) taxes on the side
of fiscal policy. Practically, this means that, if there are labor market rigidities, the best fiscal
policy action is to cut labor and capital taxes initially so as to stimulate the real economy and
only in turn raise them to bring public debt down gradually over time.2
How does our work differ? Although there has been a rich literature on the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policy,3 as well as on public debt consolidation,4 there has not
been a welfare comparison of the main tax-spending policy instruments in a unified framework
of a closed economy, and how this comparison depends on policy goals (shock stabilization
only, or shock stabilization plus debt consolidation) as well as on the presence of labor market
rigidities. Also, as said above, our results are based on optimized policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents the data, parameter values and the steady state solution. Section 4 explains how we
work. The main results are in Sections 5 and 6. Robustness checks are in Section 7. Section 8
closes the paper. Details are in an Appendix.
2These results should be contrasted to those in an open economy facing sovereign risk premia and a non-zero
probability of default, where fiscal policy instruments should be earmarked to debt consolidation almost in all
cases (see Philippopoulos et al., 2013).
3See e.g. Leeper (1991), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005 and 2007), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2008) and Leeper
et al. (2009). For reviews, see e.g. Kirsanova et al. (2009), Wren-Lewis (2010) and Leeper (2010).
4See e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), Forni et al. (2010a, 2010b), Bi et al. (2012), Cantore et al. (2012), Cogan et
al. (2013), Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and Philippopoulos et al. (2013, 2014).
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2 Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model featuring imperfect competition and Calvo-
type nominal rigidities, which is extended to include a relatively rich menu of state-contingent
policy rules.
2.1 Households
There are i = 1, 2, ..., .N identical households. Households act competitively. The objective of
each i is to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ci,t, ni,t,mi,t, gt) (1)
where ci,t is i’s consumption bundle (defined below), ni,t is i’s hours of work, mi,t is i’s real
money balances, gt is per capita public spending, 0 < β < 1 is the time preference rate and
E0 is the rational expectations operator.
In our numerical solutions, we use a utility function of the form (see also e.g. Gali, 2008):
ui,t (ci,t, ni,t,mi,t, gt) =
c1−σi,t
1− σ − χn
n1+ηi,t
1 + η
+ χm
m1−µi,t
1− µ + χg
g1−ζt
1− ζ (2)
where χn, χm, χg, σ, η, µ, ζ are standard preference parameters.
The budget constraint of each household i (written in real terms) is:
(1 + τ ct) ci,t + xi,t + bi,t +mi,t =
(
1− τkt
)
(rkt ki,t−1 + di,t)+
+ (1− τnt )wtni,t +Rt−1 Pt−1Pt bi,t−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
mi,t−1 − τ li,t
(3)
where Pt is the price index and small letters denote real variables, e.g. bi,t ≡ Bi,tPt , mi,t ≡
Mi,t
Pt
, wt ≡ WtPt , di,t ≡
Di,t
Pt
, τ li,t ≡
T li,t
Pt
. Here, xi,t is i’s real investment at t, Bi,t is i’s end-of-
period nominal government bonds, Mi,t is i’s end-of period nominal money holdings, r
k
t is the
real return to inherited capital ki,t−1, Di,t is i’s nominal dividends paid by firms, Wt is the
nominal wage rate, Rt−1 ≥ 1 is the gross nominal return to government bonds between t − 1
and t, τ li,t is real lump-sum taxes/transfers made to each i from the government, and 0 ≤ τ ct ,
τkt , τ
n
t < 1 are respectively the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labour income.
The motion of physical capital for each household i is:
ki,t = (1− δ)ki,t−1 + xi,t (4)
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where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital.
The quantity of each variety h, produced monopolistically by firm h, and consumed by
household i, is denoted as ci,t(h). The composite of goods consumed by household i is given
by:5
ci,t =
[
N∑
h=1
λ[ci,t(h)]
φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
(5)
where φ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced and
N∑
h=1
λ = 1 are weights
(to avoid scale effects, we set λ = 1/N in equilibrium). Household i’s total consumption
expenditure is:
Ptci,t =
N∑
h=1
λPt(h)ci,t(h) (6)
where Pt(h) is the price of variety h.
Details of the above problem and its solution are in Appendix 1.
2.2 Firms
There are h = 1, 2, ..., .N firms. Each firm h produces a differentiated good of variety h under
monopolistic competition facing Calvo-type nominal fixities. The nominal profit of firm h is
defined as:
Dt(h) = Pt(h)yt(h)− Ptrkt kt−1(h)−Wtnt(h) (7)
All firms use the same technology represented by the production function:
yt(h) = At[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]1−α (8)
where At is an exogenous stochastic TFP process whose motion is defined below.
Profit maximization by firm h is also subject to the demand for its product (see Appendix
2 for details):
yt(h) = ct(h) + xt(h) + gt (h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
yt (9)
5As in e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we work with summations rather than with integrals.
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which says that demand for firm h′s product, yt (h), comes from households’ consump-
tion and investment, ct(h) and xt(h), where ct(h) ≡
∑N
i=1 ci,t(h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
ct and xt(h) ≡∑N
i=1 xi,t(h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
xt, as well as from the government, gt (h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
gt.
In addition, following Calvo (1983), firms choose their prices facing a nominal fixity. In
each period, firm h faces an exogenous probability θ of not being able to reset its price. A firm
h, which is able to reset its price, chooses its price P#t (h) to maximize the sum of discounted
expected nominal profits for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its price fixed.
This objective is given by:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+kDt+k (h) = Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
{
P#t (h) yt+k (h)−Ψt+k (yt+k (h))
}
(10)
where Ξt,t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the firm, yt+k (h) =
[
P#t (h)
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k and
Ψt(.) denotes the minimum nominal cost function for producing y
H
t (h) at t so that Ψ
′
t(.) is
the associated nominal marginal cost.
Details of the above problem and its solution are in Appendix 2.
2.3 Government budget constraint
The budget constraint of the consolidated government sector expressed in real terms and
aggregate quantities is:
bt +mt = Rt−1
Pt−1
Pt
bt−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
mt−1 + gt−
−τ ctct − τkt (rkt kt−1 + dt)− τnt wtnt − τ lt
(11)
where bt is the end-of-period total stock of real public debt and mt is the end-of-period total
stock of real money balances. Note that ct ≡
∑N
i=1 ci,t, kt−1 ≡
∑N
i=1 ki,t−1, Dt ≡
∑N
i=1Di,t,
nt ≡
∑N
i=1 ni,t, Bt−1 ≡
∑N
i=1Bi,t−1 and T
l
t ≡
∑N
i=1 T
l
i,t, and all other variables have been
defined above. As above, small letters denote real variables.
In each period, one of the fiscal policy instruments τ ct , τ
k
t , τ
n
t , gt, τ
l
t, bt has to follow
residually to satisfy the government budget constraint (see below).
2.4 Decentralized equilibrium (given policy)
We now combine all the above to solve for a Decentralized Equilibrium (DE) for any feasible
monetary and fiscal policy. The DE is defined to be a sequence of allocations, prices and
policies such that: (i) all households maximize utility; (ii) a fraction (1− θ) of firms maximize
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profits by choosing an identical price P#t , while the rest, θ, set their previous period prices;
(iii) all constraints, including the government budget constraint, are satisfied; (iv) all markets
clear.
To proceed with the solution, we need to define the policy regime. Regarding monetary
policy, we assume, as is usually the case, that the nominal interest rate, Rt, is used as a
policy instrument, while money balances are endogenously detemined. Regarding fiscal policy,
we assume that, in the transition, tax rates and public spending, τ ct , τ
k
t , τ
n
t , gt, τ
l
t, are set
exogenously, while the end-of-period public debt, bt, follows residually from the government
budget constraint (see Section 4 below for a discussion of public financing cases).
Appendix 3 presents the dynamic DE system. It consists of 14 equations in 14 variables
{yt, ct, nt, xt, kt, mt, bt, Pt, P#t , P˜t, wt, mct, dt, rkt }∞t=0. This is given the independently set
policy instruments, {Rt, τ ct , τkt , τnt , gt, τ lt}∞t=0, technology {At}∞t=0, and initial conditions for
the state variables. All these variables have been defined above, except from P˜t and mct, where
P˜t ≡
(∑N
h=1 [Pt (h)]
−φ
)− 1
φ
and mct is the firm’s marginal cost as defined in Appendix 2.
Before we specify the processes of policy instruments and exogenous variables in the next
two subsections, and by following the related literature, we transform the above equilibrium
conditions. In particular, we express price levels in inflation rates, rewrite the firm’s optimality
condition in recursive form and introduce a new equation that helps us to compute household’s
expected discounted lifetime utility. Appendix 4 presents details and the resulting transformed
DE system consisting of 17 equations in 17 variables.
2.5 Policy rules
Following the related literature, we focus on simple rules for the exogenously set policy in-
struments, which means that the monetary and fiscal authorities react to a small number of
macroeconomic indicators. In particular, we allow the nominal interest rate, Rt, to follow a
standard Taylor rule, meaning that it can react to inflation and output as deviations from
a policy target, while we allow the distorting fiscal policy instruments, namely, government
spending as a share of output, sgt ≡ gtyt , and the tax rates on consumption, capital income and
labor income, τ ct , τ
k
t and τ
n
t , to react to public debt and output, again as deviations from a
policy target. The target values are defined below.
In particular, following e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), we use policy rules of the
functional form:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= φpi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ φy log
(
yt
y
)
(12)
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sgt − sg = −γgl (lt−1 − l)− γgy (yt − y) (13)
τ ct − τ c = γcl (lt−1 − l) + γcy (yt − y) (14)
τkt − τk = γkl (lt−1 − l) + γky (yt − y) (15)
τnt − τn = γnl (lt−1 − l) + γny (yt − y) (16)
where variables without time subscripts denote target values, and φpi, φy, γ
q
l , γ
q
y ≥ 0, for
q ≡ (g, c, k, n), are feedback policy coefficients, and where:
lt−1 ≡ Rt−1bt−1
yt−1
(17)
denotes the beginning-of-period public debt burden as share of GDP.
2.6 Exogenous stochastic variables
We now define the processes of exogenous stochastic variables. For notational simplicity, we
include shocks to TFP only (as we report below, the main results do not change if we add
other shocks). In particular, we assume that the TFP follows an AR(1) process:
logAt =
(
1− ρA) log (A) + ρA logAt−1 + εAt (18)
where 0 ≤ ρA ≤ 1 is a persistence parameter and εAt ∼ N
(
0, σ2A
)
.
2.7 Final equilibrium system (given feedback policy coefficients)
The final equilibrium system consists of the 17 equations of the transformed DE presented at
the end of Appendix 4, and the 5 feedback policy rules as well as the definition of lt presented
in subsection 2.5. We thus end up with 23 equations in 23 variables {yt, ct, nt, xt, kt, mt, bt,
Πt, Θt, ∆t, wt, mct, dt, r
k
t , z
1
t , z
2
t , Vt, Rt, s
g
t , τ
c
t , τ
k
t , τ
n
t , lt}∞t=0. Among them, there are 17
non-predetermined or jump variables, {yt, ct, nt, xt, Πt, Θt, wt, mct, dt, rkt , z1t , z2t , Vt, sgt , τ ct ,
τkt , τ
n
t }∞t=0, and 6 predetermined or state variables, {Rt, kt, bt, mt, ∆t, lt}∞t=0. This is given
the process of TFP in (18), initial conditions for the state variables and the values of feedback
policy coefficients in (12)-(16) which are specified below.
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To solve this non-linear difference equation system, we take a second-order approximation
around steady state. We will work as follows. We first solve the model numerically employing
common parameter values and data from the euro area. The next section (Section 3) presents
the steady state solution of this economy, or what we call the status quo. In turn, the next
sections will study the optimal choice of feedback policy coefficients, and the resulting transition
dynamics, under various policy scenaria when we depart from this status quo.
3 Data, parameterization and steady state
As said above, this section solves numerically for the steady state of the above model economy
by using conventional parameter values and data from the euro area. In steady state, the
gross inflation rate is set at one meaning zero price inflation (see Section 7 below for other
cases). Also, since policy instruments react to deviations of macroeconomic indicators from
their long-run values, feedback policy coefficients play no role in steady state.
3.1 Data and parameterization
The fiscal data are from OECD Economic Outlook no. 89. The time unit is meant to be a
quarter. Our baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 1 (see Section 7 below for
other parameter values and various robustness checks).
Using the Euler equation for bonds, the value of time preference rate, β, follows so as to be
consistent with the average value of the real interest rate in the data, 0.0075 quarterly or 0.03
annualy. The real money balances elasticity, µ, is taken from Pappa and Neiss (2005), who
estimate this value using UK data; this implies an interest-rate semi elasticity of money demand
equal to -0.29 which is a common value in this literature. The elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, σ, the inverse of Frisch labour elasticity, η, and the price elasticity of demand,
φ, are set as in Andre`s and Dome´nech (2006) and Gal´ı (2008) in related studies. Regarding
preference parameters in the utility function, χm is chosen so as to obtain a value of real money
balances as share of output equal to 1.97 quarterly, or 0.49 annually, which is close to the data
(when we use the M1 measure, the average value in the annual data is around 0.5), χn is
chosen so as to obtain steady-state labour hours equal to 0.28, while χg is arbitrarily set at 0.1
which is a common valuation of public goods in related utility functions. Other parameters,
like θ measuring Calvo-type nominal fixities, are also set as in related studies of the euro area
(see e.g. Gal´ı et al., 2001). As reported below in Section 7, our results are robust to changes
in parameter values.
Concerning the exogenous stochastic variables, we start by setting ρA = 0.8 and σA = 0.017
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for the persistence parameter and the standard deviation respectively of TFP in equation (18)
(the value of ρA is similar to that in Andre`s and Domene´ch, 2006, while the value of σa is close
to that in Bi, 2010, and Bi and Kumhof, 2009).
The steady state values of the exogenously set policy instruments are either set at their
data averages, or are calibrated to deliver data-consistent long-run values for the endogenous
variables. In particular, τ c, τk, τn are the averages of the effective tax rates in the data.
Lump-sum taxes, sl, follow residually in the long run, when total public spending as share of
output, −sl + sg, is set at 0.43 and when the public debt-to-output ratio is set at 3.4 quarterly
(or 0.85 annually), which are the values in the average data over 2008-2011.
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
a 0.33 share of capital
β 0.9926 time preference rate
µ 3.42 parameter related to money demand elasticity
δ 0.021 capital depreciation rate (quarterly)
φ 6 price elasticity of demand
η 1 inverse of Frisch labour supply elasticity
σ 1 elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ζ 1 elasticity of public consumption in utility
θ 2/3 price rigidity parameter
χm 0.05 preference parameter related to real money balances
χn 6 preference parameter related to work effort
χg 0.1 preference parameter related to public spending
ρA 0.8 serial correlation of TFP shock
σA 0.017 standard deviation of innovation to TFP shock
R 1.0075 long-run nominal interest rate
τ c 0.19 consumption tax rate
τk 0.28 capital tax rate
τn 0.38 labour tax rate
sg 0.23 government spending as share of output
−sl 0.2 government transfers as share of output
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3.2 Steady state solution or the ”status quo”
Table 2 reports the steady state solution of the model economy when we use the parameter
values and the policy instruments in Table 1. The solution makes sense and the resulting great
ratios are close to their values in the actual data (recall that, since the time unit is meant to
be a quarter, stock variables - like public debt, capital or money balances - need to be divided
by 4 to give annual values). This is what we call the ”status quo”. In what follows, we will
depart from this solution to study the implications of various policy experiments.
Table 2: Steady state solution or the ”status quo”
Variables Solution Variables Solution Data
y 0.7381 d 0.1230 -
c 0.4594 rk 0.0395 -
n 0.2784 z1 2.1820 -
x 0.1089 z2 1.8183 -
k 5.1877 u 0.8040 -
m 1.4651 cy 0.62 0.57
Π 1 by 3.4 3.4
Θ 1 xy 0.15 0.18
∆ 1 my 1.97 -
w 1.4729 ky 7 -
mc 0.8333 - - -
4 How we model policy
In this section, we explain the policy experiments we focus on (subsection 4.1), the motivation
for debt consolidation (subsection 4.2), how we model debt consolidation (subsection 4.3) and
how we compute optimized feedback policy rules (subsection 4.4). Recall that, along the
transition path, nominal rigidities imply that money is not neutral so that interest rate policy
matter to the real economy. Also, recall that, along the transition path, different counter-
cyclical policy rules, and hence different values of feedback policy coefficients, can have different
implications.
4.1 Types of policy action
We will study two environments regarding policy action. In the first, used as a benchmark,
the role of policy is only to stabilize the economy against temporary shocks. For instance, an
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adverse temporary TFP shock, as defined in equation (18) above, produces a contraction in
output and a rise in the public debt to output ratio. Then, the policy questions are which
policy instrument to use, and how strong the reaction of policy instruments to deviations from
targets should be, when these targets are given by the status quo long-run solution. Technically
speaking, in this case, we depart from, and end up, at the same steady state, which is the status
quo in subsection 3.2 above, while transition dynamics are driven by temporary shocks only.
The second environment is richer. Now the role of policy is twofold: to stabilize the
economy against the same shocks as above and, at the same time, to improve resource allocation
by gradually reducing the public debt ratio over time. The policy questions are as above
except that now the policy targets are given by the long-run solution of the reformed economy.
Technically speaking, in this case, we depart from the status quo solution, but we end up at a
new reformed long-run with lower public debt. Thus, now there are two sources of transition
dynamics: temporary shocks and the difference between the initial and the new reformed
steady state.
4.2 Is public debt bad?
Before we study the implications of different debt consolidation strategies, it is natural to ask
”Is public debt bad?”. Although it is widely recognized that we lack a theory of the optimal
level of public debt, it is also well documented that a ”high” level of public debt hurts the
macroeconomy (see e.g. Wren-Lewis, 2010, for a review of the literature). Since the study of
such issues is beyond the scope of the current paper, here we just report that, in our DSGE
New Keynesian model, a public debt lower than in the recent average data (85% of GDP) is
beneficial to the economy and this happens mainly through two channels. First, focusing on
the steady state, a lower public debt creates fiscal space and this can be used, for instance, to
cut distorting taxes (see subsection 4.3 below for public financing details). Second, focusing
on the transition, our simulations show that, if we arbitrarily assume that the economy is
subject to an initial debt shock (see also Cantore et al., 2012), this leads to a fall in output
(this happens irrespectively of the fiscal instrument used to react to the public debt gap) and
a fall in private investment (this happens when we use income taxes to react to the public debt
gap). Results and details are available upon request from the authors.
This can justify the study of different debt consolidation strategies below.
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4.3 How we model debt consolidation
We assume that the government aims to reduce the share of public debt from 85% (which
was the average value in the data over 2008-2011 and was also our status quo solution above)
to the target value of 60%. We choose the target value of 60% simply because it has been
the reference rate of the Maastricht Treaty (we report however that our main results are not
sensitive to the value of the debt target assumed). Obviously, debt reductions have to be
accommodated by adjustments in the tax-spending policy instruments, which, in our model,
are the output share of public spending, and the tax rates on capital income, labour income
and consumption.
It is widely recognized that the implications of debt consolidation depend heavily on the
public financing policy instrument used, namely, which policy instrument adjusts endogenously
to accommodate the exogenous changes in fiscal policy (see e.g. Leeper et al., 2009, and Leeper,
2010). Therefore, to understand the logic of our results, we will use one fiscal instrument at a
time. This means that, along the early costly phase, we allow one of the fiscal policy instru-
ments to react to public debt imbalances, so as to stabilize debt around its new target value of
0.6 and, at the same time, it is the same fiscal policy instrument that adjusts residually in the
long-run to close the government budget. Thus, we assume that the same policy instrument
bears the short-term cost of, and reaps the medium- and long-term benefit from, debt consoli-
dation. In our experiments, the policy rules for these instruments are as in subsection 2.5 above
except that now the targetted values are those of the reformed long-run equilibrium. All other
fiscal policy instruments, except the one used for shock stabilization and debt consolidation,
are assumed to remain unchanged over time and equal to their pre-reform status quo values.
In particular, we work as follows. We first solve and compare the steady state equilibria
with and without debt consolidation. In turn, setting, as initial conditions for the state vari-
ables, their long-run values from the solution of the economy without debt consolidation (this
is the status quo in subsection 3.2), we compute the equilibrium transition path of each re-
formed economy under optimized policy rules and in turn compute the associated conditional
expected discounted lifetime utility of the household. This is for each method of public financ-
ing used. The feedback policy coefficients along the transition path are chosen optimally. This
is explained in the next subsection.
4.4 How we compute optimized feedback policy rules
Irrespectively of the policy experiments studied, to make the comparison of different policies
meaningful, we compute optimized policy rules, so that results do not depend on ad hoc
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differences in feedback policy coefficients across different policy rules. The welfare criterion is
household’s expected discounted lifetime utility, as defined in equation (67) in the Appendix.
We work in two steps. In the first, preliminary, step, we search for the ranges of feedback
policy coefficients, as defined in equations (12-16) above, which allow us to get a locally de-
terminate equilibrium (this is what Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007, call implementable rules).
If necessary, these ranges will be further restricted in order to give economically meaningful
solutions for the policy instruments; in particular, to give non-negative nominal interest rates,
as well as tax rates and public spending ratios between zero and one (see e.g. subsection 5.2
below for numerical results).6 In our search for determinacy and well-defined policy values,
we experiment with one, or more, policy instruments and one, or more, operating targets at a
time.
In the second step, within the ranges found as explained above, we compute the welfare-
maximizing values of feedback policy coefficients (this is what Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2005
and 2007, call optimized policy rules). The welfare criterion is to maximize conditional wel-
fare, E0V0, as defined in equation (67), where conditionality refers to the initial conditions
chosen; the latter are given by the status quo long-run solution. To this end, following e.g.
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), we take a second-order approximation to both the equilib-
rium conditions and the welfare criterion. As is well known, this is consistent with risk-averse
behavior on the part of economic agents and can also help us to avoid possible spurious welfare
results that may arise when one takes a second-order approximation to the welfare criterion
combined with a first-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions (see e.g. Gal´ı, 2008,
Malley et al., 2009, and Benigno and Woodford, 2012).
In particular, we first compute a second-order accurate approximation of conditional wel-
fare, and the associated decentralized equilbrium, as functions of feedback policy coefficients
by using the perturbation method of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) and, in turn, we use a
matlab function (fminsearch.m) to compute the values of the feedback policy coefficients that
maximize the second-order accurate approximation of conditional welfare (our matlab routines
are available upon request). In this exercise, as said above, the feedback policy coefficients
are restricted to be within some prespecified ranges delivering determinacy as well as mean-
6Thus, we implement the zero lower bound (ZLB) for the nominal interest rate simply by restricting the
feedback policy coefficients in the Taylor rule, (12). In the same way, since we study optimized fiscal action
which may result in large deviations of fiscal instruments from their data averages, we also need to restrict
the feedback policy coefficients in the fiscal policy rules, (13)-(16). Keep in mind that these restrictions (on
monetary and fiscal feedback policy coefficients) may change when the specification of the model changes; we
will thus report ranges in each case studied. The way we work is practically the same as in e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2007) who ”approximate the zero lower bound constraint by requiring a low volatility of the nominal
interest rate relative to its target value”. However, see the criticism of such linearizations and higher-order
perturbation techniques in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2012).
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ingful values for the policy instruments. We work in this way both without, and with, debt
consolidation.
5 Main results
This section presents the main numerical solutions. We start by presenting the steady state
solution of the reformed economy with debt consolidation.
5.1 Steady state utility and output with debt consolidation
The new reformed steady state with debt consolidation is as defined in subsection 4.3 above.
In other words, thanks to the fiscal space created by debt reduction, public spending can rise,
or a tax rate can be reduced, residually.
Table 3 reports steady-state utility and output under alternative public financing cases in
the reformed economy. For instance, in the first row of Table 3, the assumption is that it
is public spending that takes advantage of debt reduction, in the sense that, once the debt
burden has been reduced, public spending can increase relative to its value in the status quo
solution. In the other rows, the fiscal space is used to finance cuts in one of the three tax rates.
Table 3 reveals that the highest utility and output are achieved when the fiscal space is used
to finance a cut in capital tax rates (this is further discussed below).
Table 3: Steady-state utility and output in the reformed economy
residual fiscal
instrument
steady-state
utility
steady-state
output
s∗g 0.799820 0.7418
τ∗c 0.807246 0.7418
τ∗k 0.812269 0.7479
τ∗n 0.810851 0.7460
5.2 Ranges of feedback policy coefficients
Moving to transition, we first check for local determinacy. As is well known, the latter may
depend crucially on the values of feedback policy coefficiencts. In our model, (monetary and
fiscal) policy guarantees determinacy, when the nominal interest rate reacts aggressively to
inflation with φpi > 1.1, that is, when the Taylor principle is satisfied, and, at the same time,
the fiscal policy instruments, sgt , τ
c
t , τ
k
t , τ
n
t react to public liabilities above a critical minimum
value, γql >γ
q
l > 0, where critical minimum values differ across different policy instruments (in
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particular, γgl = 0.0069, γ
c
l = 0.0345, γ
k
l = 0.017 and γ
n
l = 0.0138).
7 By contrast, the values of
φy and γ
q
y, measuring respectively the reaction of interest rate policy and fiscal policy to the
output gap, are not found to be critical to determinacy.8
Nevertheless, as said in subsection 4.4 above, the feedback fiscal policy coefficients on
public debt, γql , where q ≡ (g, c, k, n), may need to be further restricted in order to get
meaningful solutions for the fiscal instruments used, i.e. in order to get 0 ≤ sgt , τ ct , τkt , τnt < 1.
In particular, our computations imply that we need to work within the ranges γkl ∈ (0.017, 0.15)
for the capital tax rate and γcl ∈ (0.0345, 0.2) for the consumption tax rate, which are narrower
than those required for determinacy only. This makes sense. When debt consolidation is
among the policy aims, the fiscal authorities may find it optimal to increase tax rates, and/or
reduce public spending, beyond meaningful or historical ranges. Our simulations imply that
this applies in particular to the capital tax rate, τkt , which, if it is left free, it can easily rise
above 100% in the short run due to the high value of γkl chosen (this is consistent with the
Ramsey-Chamley result that, since capital is inelastic in the very short, the fiscal authorities
may find it optimal to confiscate it). To avoid such problems, we restrict ourselves within the
above ranges for γkl and γ
c
l . Similarly, since in some experiments monetary policy may find
it optimal to increase the feedback policy coefficient on inflation, φpi, to very high values, we
restrict its value within the range 1.1 < φpi ≤ 3 (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007, for
a similar upper boundary). Within this range, the resulting equilibrium nominal interest rate
is above the zero lower bound in all solutions reported below and this happens irrespectively
of the fiscal policy instrument used jointly with interest rate policy. It is worth reporting
that our main results regarding the welfare ranking of policy instruments do not depend on
those policy restrictions (results are available upon request). Also, note that such practice
(namely, imposing restrictions on policy instruments) is usual both in the policy literature (see
e.g. Cantore et al., 2012), as well as in the theoretical literature on optimal taxation (see e.g.
Chamley, 1986).
7Actually, we can distinguish two regions of determinacy. In addition to the one discussed above, there is
another region in which fiscal policy does not react to public liabilities, i.e. γql = 0 for all fiscal instruments,
while monetary policy reacts to inflation mildly with φpi ≤ 1.1. This region is welfare inferior to the region
discussed above. It also contains some sub-areas where determinacy breaks down. Several other papers on the
fiscal theory of the price level have distinguished betwen the same two areas of determinacy (e.g. Leeper, 1991,
and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007).
8On the other hand, if we had included a tax on income from government bonds, we would have had to assume
a narrower, more restrictive, range of feedback monetary policy reaction to inflation. For instance, if the tax
rate is 0.2, monetary policy can guarantee determinacy when the nominal interest rate reacts to inflation with
φpi > 1.29 when fiscal policy uses government spending or consumption taxes to react to debt, with φpi > 1.43
when fiscal policy uses capital taxes to react to debt and with φpi > 1.57 when fiscal policy uses labour taxes to
react to debt. As the tax rate on income from government bonds increases, the critical minimum value of φpi
required for determinacy also increases (results are available upon request). This is similar qualitatively to the
results in Edge and Rudd (2007).
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Thus, the general message is that monetary and fiscal policy need to interact with each
other in a specific way for policy to guarantee determinacy or, as Leeper (2010) puts it, there
is a ”dirty little secret”: for monetary policy to control inflation, fiscal policy must behave in
a particular manner. Benhabib et al. (2001) have also shown that the fiscal-monetary regime
affects determinacy.
5.3 Optimized policy rules and welfare with debt consolidation
Within the above specified ranges for the feedback policy coefficients, we now compute opti-
mized policy rules. Recall, as explained in subsection 4.1 above, that there are two sources of
transition dynamics in this economy: temporary TFP shocks (whose moments were defined in
subsection 3.1) and debt consolidation reforms (as defined in subsection 4.3).
Results for the case with debt consolidation are reported in Table 4. The first colunm lists
the pair of policy instruments used (one monetary and one fiscal), the second column reports
the optimal reaction of the interest rate to inflation and output, and the third column reports
the optimal reaction of each fiscal policy instrument to debt and output. Expected discounted
lifetime utility, E0V0, is reported in the last column.
There are three messages from Table 4. First, regarding monetary policy, the interest rate
should react aggressively to inflation, while, reaction to the output gap is negligible. The
idea behind the very small value of φy is that stabilization of output around its steady state
value is accompanied by increased volatility in inflation and nominal interest rates and this is
not desirable.9 The optimal reaction to the output gap, from the point of view of monetary
authorities, is revisited in Section 7 below. Second, regarding fiscal policy, when we use public
spending, or consumption taxes, or capital taxes, fiscal reaction to the output gap is smaller
in magnitude than fiscal reaction to public debt. This means that public spending should fall,
while consumption taxes and capital taxes should rise, to address the public debt problem. By
contrast, when we use labor taxes, reaction to ouput is clearly stronger than reaction to debt.
This means that the labor tax rate should be reduced at impact to help the real economy. In
other words, a particularly distorting policy instrument, like labor taxes, should be used to
address output imbalances rather than to reduce the debt burden. All this is confirmed by the
impulse response functions shown below. Third, when we rank policy instruments according to
expected discounted lifetime utility, E0V0, the best possible mix is Rt and s
g
t . Notice that, to
the extent that feedback policy coefficients are chosen optimally, welfare differences, at least in
9This is as in e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). The desirability of not responding to the output gap, at
least when the output target is the steady state value of output, is confirmed when we keep φpi at its optimal
value and arbitrarily increase φy; then, the volatility of both inflation and output rises. The same happens when
we arbitrarily increase φy and decrease φpi.
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terms of lifetime utility, across different policy mixes are very small.10 Keep in mind however
that this welfare ranking is in terms of lifetime utility only; shorter time horizons may imply
different things (see below).
Table 4 : Optimal monetary reaction to inflation and output
and optimal fiscal reaction to debt and output
Policy
instruments
Optimal interest-rate
reaction to inflation
and output
Optimal fiscal
reaction to
debt and output
Lifetime
utility
E0V0
Rt s
g
t
φpi = 1.1
φy = 0.0011
γgl = 0.1927
γgy = 0.1134
109.2534
Rt τ
c
t
φpi = 2.7983
φy = 0.0098
γcl = 0.1943
γcy = 0.0036
109.0918
Rt τ
k
t
φpi = 2.9323
φy = 0.0037
γkl = 0.1499
γky = 0.0007
109.0754
Rt τ
n
t
φpi = 2.983
φy = 0.0728
γnl = 0.0129
γny = 0.1138
108.7748
The optimized policy rules shape the motion of public debt over time. Figure 1 shows the
resulting path of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The duration of the debt consolidation phase,
or equivalently the speed of debt reduction, depends heavily on the fiscal policy instrument
used. In particular, more than 95% of debt consolidation should be achieved within 20 time
periods (5 years), if we use the public spending ratio, sgt ; within 20 time periods (5 years), if we
use the consumption tax rate, τ ct ; and within 50 time periods (12.5 years), if we use the capital
tax rate, τkt . On the other hand, if we use the labor tax rate, τ
n
t , the debt-to-output ratio
should converge very slowly to its 60% target looking like a unit-root process. The general idea
is that the more distorting the policy instrument is, the slower the debt adjustment should be.
5.4 Welfare over various time horizons with and without debt consolidation
We now study what happens to welfare over various time horizons. This is important because,
for several (political-economy) reasons, economic agents’ behavior can be short sighted. Setting
10When we express welfare differences using consumption equivalents, as in e.g. Lucas (1990), the results
are the same. In particular, in Table 4, when the reference regime is Rt and s
g
t ,the welfare losses expressed in
consumption equivalents are -0.0012 when we use consumption taxes, -0.0013 when we use capital taxes and
-0.0035 when we use labour taxes.
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Figure 1: The path of public debt as share of output
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the feedback policy coefficients as in Table 4 above, the expected discounted utility at various
time horizons is reported in Table 5. In the same Table, we also report results without debt
consolidation other things equal (these are the numbers in parentheses). As said in subsection
4.1, without debt consolidation, we again compute optimized policy rules but now the economy
starts from, and returns to, the status quo solution.
There are two messages from Table 5. First, when we focus on lifetime utility, welfare
differences between debt consolidation and no debt consolidation look to be small.11 But, a
more careful inspection of the results in Table 5 reveals that this happens only because short-
term effects work in opposite direction from medium- and long-term effects, so that the net,
or lifetime, effects are small. In particular, the comparison of outcomes with consolidation to
outcomes without consolidation implies that, in most cases, consolidation is costly in the short
run and that these costs are not trivial.12 By contrast, after the first 60 periods or 15 years, debt
consolidation becomes superior across all cases and this more than offsets its short-term costs,
so that, eventually, the lifetime, or net, utility becomes higher with debt consolidation. Second,
without debt consolidation, and to the extent that feedback policy coefficients are optimally
chosen, the choice of the fiscal policy instrument used is trivial. Welfare differences appear
after the second decimal point across all time horizons (these are the numbers in parentheses).
On the other hand, with debt consolidation, the choice of the policy instrument matters more
(these are the numbers without parentheses). Now, except from the case in which we care only
11When expressed in consumption equivalents, the welfare gains of debt consolidation are 0.0036 when we use
government spending, 0.0025 when we use consumption taxes, 0.0024 when we use capital taxes and 0.00024
when we use labor taxes. In each case, the reference regime is the case without debt consolidation.
12The exception is when we use the capital tax rate in which case debt consolidation is clearly superior even
in the short term. This is consistent with the Chamley-Judd result. Namely, in the very short run, capital
taxes act as a capital levy on predetermined wealth so that the best fiscal policy is to bring public debt down
by higher capital taxes. Recall that here policy is conducted by rules.
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about the short run, the best policy mix is Rt− sgt . In the short run, by contrast, the best mix
is Rt − τkt for the reasons explained above.
Table 5 : Welfare over different time horizons
with, and without, debt consolidation
2 periods 4 periods 10 periods 60 periods
Lifetime
utility
E0V0
Rt s
g
t
1.5655
(1.6029)
3.1990
(3.1822)
7.9406
(7.7822)
39.7726
(39.0939)
109.2534
(108.7662)
Rt τ
c
t
1.4188
(1.6024)
2.8775
(3.1818)
7.3441
(7.7809)
39.1210
(39.0883)
109.0918
(108.749)
Rt τ
k
t
1.6667
(1.6030)
3.2929
(3.1825)
7.9569
(7.7827)
39.8577
(39.0870)
109.0754
(108.7452)
Rt τ
n
t
1.6016
(1.6026)
3.1796
(3.1818)
7.7736
(7.7814)
39.1113
(39.0756)
108.7748
(108.7420)
Notes: Results without debt consolidation in parentheses. Periods denote quarters.
6 Adding labor market rigidities
The previous analysis has assumed away any rigidities in the labor market. This is questionable
since it is widely believed that labor market rigidities are a key feature of the European economy
(see e.g. Blanchard, 2004). In this subsection, we extend the model to allow for such rigidities.
To avoid further complicating the model, but to also help it replicate the stylized facts in
Europe regarding inertia in wage adjustment, we follow the setup employed in Blanchard and
Gal´ı (2007), Malley et al. (2009) and many others. In particular, we start by assuming that
the nominal wage rate at time t is a weighted average of the nominal wage in the previous
period, t−1, and the nominal wage that would arise in case the labor market worked perfectly.
In turn, expressing variables in real terms, the real wage rate follows the rule:
wt ≡
(
wt−1
Pt−1
Pt
)γ
(MRSt)
1−γ (19)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 measures the degree of wage sluggishness and MRSt ≡ χn(1+τ
c
t )n
η
i,t
(1−τnt )c−σi,t
(see equation (30) in Appendix 1). The idea behind this partial adjustment model is that
real wages respond only sluggishly to current conditions in the labor market. As pointed out
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by Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007), ”this is a parsimonious way of modeling the slow adjustment
of wages to labor market conditions, as found in a variety of models of real wage rigidities,
without taking a stand on what is the ”right” model”. In other words, although ad hoc, this
specification can be consistent with a number of possible sources of rigidity in European labor
markets, e.g. institutional, legal and socio-political rigidities and safety nets, etc. Finally,
notice that this modeling has the following advantages: (i) if γ = 0, the standard model is
obtained; (ii) in the steady-state, i.e. when wt = wt−1 = w, it follows that again w = MRS.
If γ = 1, we have full persistence in wage setting. In our numerical solutions below, we set
γ = 0.9, which is close to the value used by Malley et al. (2009) for a number of European
economies.
6.1 Results with labor market rigidities
The model is resolved using the new specification in the labor market. Regarding ranges of
feedback policy coefficients graranteeing determinacy and meaningful solutions for the policy
instruments, we report that these ranges practically remain as in subsection 5.2 above, except
that now, when we use capital and labor taxes on the side of fiscal policy, the minimum
boundaries of interest rate reaction to inflation are related to the minimum boundaries of
fiscal policy reaction to public debt (namely, if we allow the fiscal reaction to debt to rise, the
monetary reaction to inflation needs also to rise to guarantee determinacy).
Within these ranges, the new results are reported in Tables 6 and 7, which are like Tables
4 and 5 respectively. There are three messages. First, optimal fiscal reaction to the output gap
is now much bigger than in the case without labor market rigidities. That is, now the fiscal
authorities find it optimal to also react to the recession so that debt reduction is not their only
concern. Actually, in the case of public spending, capital taxes and labor taxes, the coefficient
on the output gap is bigger than the coefficient on the debt gap; this means that now public
spending should rise, and capital and labor taxes should fall, in order to stimulate the economy,
and only in turn be used to address the debt problem. Second, when there are rigidities in the
labor market, it is better to use income tax rates along with the interest rate. That is, under
debt consolidation, the mixes Rt−τkt and Rt−τnt score better than Rt−sgt and this is the case
both in the very short run and in the long run. Intuitively, this follows naturally from the first
result above: since the emphasis should be now given to the real economy, it is better to use
fiscal instruments, like income taxes, which can more more effectively stimulate the economy
and which are relatively close to the heart of the labor market imperfection. Third, monetary
reaction to the output gap remains very small, as it was also the case in Table 4.
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Table 6 : Optimal monetary reaction to inflation and output
and optimal fiscal reaction to debt and output (with labor rigidities)
Policy
instruments
Optimal interest-rate
reaction to inflation
and output
Optimal fiscal
reaction to
debt and output
Lifetime
utility
E0V0
Rt s
g
t
φpi = 2.9988
φy = 0.0001
γgl = 0.1368
γgy = 0.3907
109.067
Rt τ
c
t
φpi = 2.9988
φy = 0.0186
γcl = 0.2598
γcy = 0.1514
109.0807
Rt τ
k
t
φpi = 1.1
φy = 0.0306
γkl = 0.0119
γky = 0.424
109.174
Rt τ
n
t
φpi = 1.102
φy = 0.0456
γnl = 0.0143
γny = 0.8083
109.1488
Table 7: Welfare over different time horizons
with, and without, debt consolidation (with labor rigidities)
2 periods 4 periods 10 periods 60 periods
Lifetime
utility
E0V0
Rt s
g
t
1.5659
(1.6018)
3.1442
(3.1808)
7.8545
(7.7771)
39.6939
(39.0880)
109.067
(108.8049)
Rt τ
c
t
1.3337
(1.6005)
2.7513
(3.1783)
7.2392
(7.7786)
39.1385
(39.0736)
109.0807
(108.759)
Rt τ
k
t
1.5963
(1.6011)
3.1645
(3.1795)
7.7320
(7.7739)
39.1589
(39.0732)
109.174
(108.756)
Rt τ
n
t
1.6090
(1.6012)
3.1730
(3.1793)
7.7272
(7.7792)
39.0825
(39.0863)
109.1488
(108.7728)
Notes: Results without debt consolidation in parentheses. Periods denote quarters.
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The resulting public debt dynamics are shown in Figure 2. The general message is that
it is optimal to reduce public debt more gradually than in Figure 1. In particular, when we
use public spending or consumption taxes, debt adjustment should take place at a slower pace
during the first 5-10 periods or quarters. But the difference from Figure 1 becomes more
striking when we use capital and labour income taxes. Now, it is clearly optimal to let the
debt-to-output ratio further rise in the very short run, so as to help the real economy recover
first, and only then decrease the debt gradually by following an almost unit root process to its
60% target.
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Figure 2: The path of public debt as share of output
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6.2 Impulse responce functions of optimized fiscal instruments with and
withour labor rigidities
To make our results clearer, we also provide the impulse response functions of the optimized
fiscal policy instruments studied above. This is shown in Figure 3. In this Figure, impulse
responce functions are computed as log-linear deviations from the status-quo solution. In these
impulses, dynamics are driven by an adverse shock to TFP and by the debt consolidation
reform. Solid lines correspond to the model without wage rigidities. Broken lines correspond
to the model with wage rigidities.
As can be seen in Figure 3, consumption tax rates should rise, with or without wage
rigidities. Public spending should clearly fall without wage rigidities, while this fall should
be milder in the presence of wage rigidities (actually, recall from the values of feedback policy
coefficients in Table 6, which were based on second-order approximations, that public spending
should rise at impact in the presence of wage rigidities). The degree of wage rigidities also
plays an important role when we use income taxes. If there are no such rigidities, capital tax
rates should rise to bring public debt down. But, if there are wage rigidities, the change in
capital taxes should be very mild to help the real economy recover first. The policy emphasis
on the real activity becomes even more obvious when we use labor taxes which are particularly
distorting. Now, labor tax rates should be cut so as to counter the recession and only later
on they should be raised to address the debt problem; naturally, this gets more obvious in the
presence of labor rigidities.
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Figure 3: Impulse responce functions of optimized fiscal instruments
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7 Robustness
We finally conduct a sensitivity analysis. For instance, we check robustness to changes in
parameter values; to different initial values for the state variables like public debt; to assuming
a more volatile economy; and to two generalizations of the model that allow for policy reaction
to the natural level of output and for trend inflation.
The bottom line will be that the main results (e.g. the welfare ranking of fiscal policy
instruments, the comparison between debt consolidation and non debt consolidation, and how
monetary and fiscal policy instruments should react to economic indicators) remain unaffected.
7.1 Alternative parameterizations of the model
We first report that our results are robust to changes in the magnitude of all key parameter
values. For instance, we have experimented with changes in the values of the Calvo parameter
in the firm’s problem, θ, and the preference parameter for public goods, χg, whose values
are relatively unknown. Our main results do not change within the ranges 0.33 ≤ θ ≤ 0.75
and 0 ≤ χg ≤ 0.09. Our results are also robust to changes in the preference parameter
for real money balances, χm. In particular, all results remain unchanged within the range
0.01 ≤ χm ≤ 0.1.13
Results are available upon request.
13Actually, most results remain unchanged even within the wider range 0.005 ≤ χm ≤ 0.1. Note however that
very low values of χm, like 0.005, result in values for real money balances as share of output that are too low
relative to the data (as said in subsection 3.1, the data average annual value is around 0.5). Thus, the range
0.01 ≤ χm ≤ 0.1 gives values close to the data.
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7.2 Different initial values of public debt
Our results are robust to changes in the initial value of public debt. Recall that so far the
starting value of public debt as share of output has been 85% which was the average annual
value over 2008-2011 in the data. Our results are not affected if instead we start with, say,
88% (data value in 2011) or 93% (data value in 2012).
Results are again available upon request.
7.3 Allowing for a more volatile economy
Our results are robust to assuming a more volatile economy. This can be captured by a higher
standard deviation of the existing TFP shock (for instance, an arbitrary increase in standard
deviation from 0.017, which has been its value so far, to 0.034), or by adding new shocks, like
policy shocks in the feedback rules (12)-(16) as well as shocks to the time preference rate.14
It is worth pointing out however that, when extrinsic volatiliy rises (meaning a higher stan-
dard deviation and/or more sources of stochasticity), we need, in most cases, to further restrict
the range of feedback policy coefficients in order to guarantee determinacy and well-defined
values for the policy instruments employed for cyclical stabilization and debt consolidation.
Again, results are available upon request.
7.4 Policy reaction to the natural level of output
We now assume that, in each time period, policymakers react to the current natural level of
output rather than to its steady state level. The natural level of output is defined as the level
of output that would arise in the absence of nominal fixities. Technically, this means that
the policy target for output in the feedback policy rules, (12)-(16), is now time-varying and
its value follows from the fictional case in which, other things equal, the Calvo parameter is
set at zero. Thus, we first solve for this fictional case (always computing welfare-maximizing
feedback policy coefficients and the associated equilirium values of the endogenous variables
including output) and, in turn, we use the resulting time-path of the natural level of output
as a time-varying target in the policy rules (12)-(16).
The new results, when policymakers react to the natural level of output, are reported in
Table A.1 in Appendix 5, which is like Table 4 in the main text (since nominal fixities play no
real role in the long run, the steady state solution remains the same as in Table 2). Comparison
of these Tables implies that the main results do not change. On the other hand, there are some
14We model shocks to the time preference rate by using an AR(1) process like that in equation (18) used for
the TFP shock. Our main results do not change.
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interesting quantitative differences. For instance, optimal interest rate reaction to the output
gap, as measured by φy, is much stronger in Table A.1 than it was in Table 4. This makes
sense: while monetary policy should not respond to the output gap when the output target in
the gap is its steady state level, reaction to this gap becomes more desirable when the output
target accounts for the distortions in output caused by, for instance, nominal fixities (see also
e.g. Kirsanova et al., 2009, and Sims, 2013, for which measure of output should be targeted
by the central bank in interest rate rules).15 Thus, although the feedback policy coefficient on
inflation, φpi, is still higher than the coefficient on output, φy, response to output is welfare
enhancing relative to Table 4, where the interest rate responded solely to inflation. To put it
differently, although inflation remains the main concern of monetary authorities, it is not the
sole concern.
7.5 Allowing for trend inflation
We now allow for trend or steady state inflation. For instance, we allow the gross steady state
rate of inflation, Π, to be 1.005 quarterly (or 1.02 annually) which is perceived to be the target
value of the European Central Bank. This requires recalibration of the model. The new results
are reported in Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix 6, which are respectively like Tables 2 and 4 in
the main text. As is known (see e.g. Ascari, 2004), trend inflation can play a non-trivial role.
For instance, steady state output falls with inflation (see page 650 in Ascari, 2004, and page
215 in Wickens, 2008, for interpretation of the output loss as trend inflation rises). Here, we
get similar results: steady state output and utility are lower in Table A.2 with positive trend
inflation than in Table 2 with zero trend inflation. Expected discounted lifetime utility is also
lower with positive trend inflation irrespectively of the fiscal policy instrument used (compare
Table A.3 to Table 4). Nevertheless, the main qualitative results do not change. For instance,
public spending is again the least distorting fiscal policy instrument, and labor taxes the most
distorting one, as it was the case in Table 4.
8 Concluding remarks and possible extensions
This paper studied the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy actions in a New Keynesian
model of a closed economy. The aim was to welfare rank different fiscal (tax and spending)
15It is useful to report the following experiment. We exogenously set φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0.35 which are
typical numbers in a Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate. Then, our computations, with such ad hoc policy
coefficients, show that the standard deviation of both inflation and output are lower when the output target
in the output gap measure is the current-period natural level of output than when the output target is its
time-invariant steady state level.
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policy instruments when, at the same time, the central bank followed a Taylor rule for the
nominal interest rate. We did so when the policy task was to stabilize the economy against
shocks and to reduce public debt over time.
Since the results have been listed in the Introduction, we close with some extensions. A first
natural extension is to see what changes in an open economy setup. Actually, in two companion
papers (Philippopoulos et al., 2013 and 2014), we have done so by examining respectively the
case of a semi-small open economy facing sovereign risk premia when it borrows from abroad
and the case of a multi-country model of a currency union with debtor and creditor country-
members. We find that openess can change the results.
This type of work can be further extended in several ways. For instance, it would be inter-
esting to study the implications of less conventional monetary policy instruments, like the case
in which the central bank acts as a lender of last resort. Similarly, it would be interesting to use
a more detailed decomposition of public spending (like spending on infrastructure, education
services, social security, etc) and reexamine the attractiveness of each one of those spending
categories as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization (but this would require a richer model
where each public spending category functions a well-specified role). Finally, one could allow
for a different policy reaction to economic fundamentals during booms and during recessions
(although, as far as we know, policy regime switching is a challenging task computationally;
see e.g. Foerster et al., 2014). We leave these extensions for future work.
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9 Appendices
9.1 Appendix 1: Households
This Appendix provides details and the solution of household’s problem. There are i =
1, 2, ..., N households. Each household i acts competitively to maximize expected lifetime
utility.
9.1.1 Household’s problem
Household i’s expected lifetime utility is:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ci,t, ni,t,mi,t, gt) (20)
where ci,t is i’s consumption bundle (defined below), ni,t is i’s hours of work, mi,t ≡ Mi,tPt is i’s
real money balances, gt is per capita public spending, 0 < β < 1 is the time discount rate, and
E0 is the rational expectations operator conditional on the current period information set.
We will use a utility function of the form:
ui,t (ci,t, ni,t,mi,t, gt) =
c1−σi,t
1− σ − χn
n1+ηi,t
1 + η
+ χm
m1−µi,t
1− µ + χg
g1−ζt
1− ζ (21)
where χn, χm, χg, σ, η, µ, ζ are standard preference parameters.
The period budget constraint of each household i is in nominal terms:
(1 + τ ct)Ptci,t + Ptxi,t +Bi,t +Mi,t =(
1− τkt
)
(rkt Ptki,t−1 +Di,t) + (1− τnt )Wtni,t +Rt−1Bi,t−1 +Mi,t−1 − T li,t
(22)
where Pt is the price index, xi,t is i’s real investment, Bi,t is i’s end-of-period nominal govern-
ment bonds, Mi,t is i’s end-of period nominal money holdings, r
k
t is the real return to inherited
capital, ki,t−1, Di,t is i’s nominal dividends paid by firms, Wt is the nominal wage rate, Rt−1 is
the gross nominal return to government bonds between t− 1 and t, T li,t is nominal lump-sum
taxes/transfers to each i from the government, and τ ct , τ
k
t , τ
n
t are respectively tax rates on
private consumption, capital income and labour income.
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Dividing by Pt, the budget constraint of each i in real terms is:
(1 + τ ct) ci,t + xi,t + bi,t +mi,t =
(
1− τkt
)
(rkt ki,t−1 + di,t)+
+ (1− τnt )wtni,t +Rt−1 Pt−1Pt bi,t−1 +
Pt−1
Pt
mi,t−1 − τ li,t
(23)
where small letters denote real variables, i.e. bi,t ≡ Bi,tPt , mi,t ≡
Mi,t
Pt
, wt ≡ WtPt , di,t ≡
Di,t
Pt
,
τ li,t ≡
T li,t
Pt
, at individual level.
The motion of physical capital for each household i is:
ki,t = (1− δ)ki,t−1 + xi,t (24)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital.
Household i’s consumption bundle at t, ci,t, is a composite of h = 1, 2, ..., N varieties of
goods, denoted as ci,t(h), where each variety h is produced monopolistically by one firm h.
Using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, we define:
ci,t =
[
N∑
h=1
λ[ci,t(h)]
φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
(25)
where φ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced and
N∑
h=1
λ = 1 are weights
(to avoid scale effects, we set λ = 1/N).
Household i’s total consumption expenditure is:
Ptci,t =
N∑
h=1
λPt(h)ci,t(h) (26)
where Pt(h) is the price of variety h.
9.1.2 Household’s optimality conditions
Each household i acts competitively taking prices and policy as given. Following the related
literature, we first suppose that the household chooses its desired consumption of the composite
good, ci,t, and, in turn, chooses how to distribute its purchases of individual varieties, ci,t(h).
The first-order conditions include the budget constraint above and:
c−σi,t
(1 + τ ct)
= βEt
c−σi,t+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) [(1− τkt+1) rkt+1 + (1− δ)] (27)
c−σi.t
(1 + τ ct)
= βEt
c−σi,t+1(
1 + τ ct+1
)Rt Pt
Pt+1
(28)
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χmm
−µ
i,t −
c−σi,t
(1 + τ ct)
+ βEt
c−σi,t+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) Pt
Pt+1
= 0 (29)
χn
nηi,t
c−σi,t
=
(1− τnt )
(1 + τ ct)
wt (30)
ci,t(h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
ci,t (31)
Equations (27) and (28) are respectively the Euler equations for capital and bonds, (29) is the
optimality condition for money balances, (30) is the optimality condition for work hours and
(31) shows the optimal demand for each variety of goods.
Notice that equations (26) and (31) imply for the price index:
Pt =
[
N∑
h=1
λ[Pt(h)]
1−φ
] 1
1−φ
(32)
9.2 Appendix 2: Firms
This Appendix provides details and the solution of firm’s problem. There are h = 1, 2, ..., N
firms. Each firm h produces a differentiated good of variety h under monopolistic competition
facing Calvo-type nominal fixities.
9.2.1 Demand for firm’s product
Each firm h faces demand for its product, yt (h). The latter comes from households’ consump-
tion and investment, ct(h) and xt(h), where ct(h) ≡
∑N
i=1 ci,t(h) and xt(h) ≡
∑N
i=1 xi,t(h), and
from the government, gt (h). Thus,
yt (h) = ct(h) + xt(h) + gt (h) (33)
where we have from above:
ct(h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
ct (34)
and similarly:
xt (h) =
[
Pt (h)
Pt
]−φ
xt (35)
gt (h) =
[
Pt (h)
Pt
]−φ
gt (36)
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where ct ≡
∑N
i=1 ci,t it total private consumption, xt ≡
∑N
i=1 xi,t is total private investment
and gt is total public spending.
Since, at the economy level:
yt = ct + xt + gt (37)
the above equations imply that the demand for each firm’s product is:
yt (h) = ct(h) + xt(h) + gt (h) =
[
Pt (h)
Pt
]−φ
yt (38)
9.2.2 Firm’s problem
Nominal profit of each firm h is:
Dt(h) = Pt(h)yt(h)− Ptrkt kt−1(h)−Wtnt(h) (39)
All firms use the same technology represented by the production function:
yt(h) = At[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]1−α (40)
where At is an exogenous stochastic TFP process.
Under imperfect competition, profit maximization is subject to the demand function derived
above, namely:
yt(h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt
]−φ
yt (41)
In addition, following Calvo (1983), firms choose their prices facing a nominal fixity. In
each period, firm h faces an exogenous probability θ of not being able to reset its price. A firm
h, which is able to reset its price, chooses its price P#t (h) to maximize the sum of discounted
expected nominal profits for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its price fixed.
9.2.3 Firm’s optimality conditions
Following the related literature, we follow a two-step procedure. We first solve a cost minimiza-
tion problem, where each firm h minimizes its cost by choosing factor inputs given technology
and prices. The solution will give a minimum nominal cost function, which is a function of
factor prices and output produced by the firm. In turn, given this cost function, each firm,
which is able to reset its price, solves a maximization problem by choosing its price.
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The solution to the cost minimization problem gives the input demand functions:
wt = mct(1− a)At[kt−1(h)]α[nt(h)]−α (42)
rkt = mctaAt[kt−1(h)]
α−1[nt(h)]1−α (43)
where mct = Ψ
′
t(.) is the marginal nominal cost with Ψt(.) denoting the associated minimum
nominal cost function for producing yt (h) at t.
Then, the firm chooses its price, P#t (h), to maximize nominal profits:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+kDt+k (h) = Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
{
P#t (h) yt+k (h)−Ψt+k (yt+k (h))
}
where Ξt,t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the firm and where yt+k (h) =
[
P#t (h)
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k.
The first-order condition gives:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
[
P#t (h)
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k
{
P#t (h)−
φ
φ− 1Ψ
′
t+k
}
= 0 (44)
Dividing by the aggregate price index, Pt, we have:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θk[Ξt,t+k
[
P#t (h)
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k
{
P#t (h)
Pt
− φ
φ− 1mct+k
Pt+k
Pt
}
] = 0 (45)
Thus, the behaviour of firm h, which can reset its price, is summarized by (42), (43) and
(45).
Each firm h, which can reset its price in period t, solves an identical problem, so P#t (h) =
P#t is independent of h, and each firm h, which cannot reset its price, just sets its previous
period price Pt (h) = Pt−1 (h) . Then, it can be shown that the evolution of the aggregate price
level is given by:
(Pt)
1−φ = θ (Pt−1)1−φ + (1− θ)
(
P#t
)1−φ
(46)
9.3 Appendix 3: Decentralized equilibrium (given policy instruments)
We now combine the above to solve for a Decentralized Equilibrium (DE) for any feasible
monetary and fiscal policy. In this DE, (i) all households maximize utility (ii) a fraction
(1− θ) of firms maximize profits by choosing the identical price P#t , while the rest, θ, set their
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previous period prices (iii) all constraints are satisfied and (iv) all markets clear.
The DE is summarized by the following conditions (quantities are in per capita terms):
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
= βEt
ct+1
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
) [(1− τkt+1) rkt+1 + (1− δ)] (47)
c−σt
1
(1 + τ ct)
= βEtRt
c−σt+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) Pt
Pt+1
(48)
χmm
−µ
t −
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
+ βEt
c−σt+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) Pt
Pt+1
= 0 (49)
χn
n
η
t
c−σt
=
(1− τnt )
(1 + τ ct)
wt (50)
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + xt (51)
Et
∞∑
k=0
θk
Ξt,t+k
[
P#t
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k
(
P#t
Pt
− φ
φ− 1mct+k
Pt+k
Pt
) = 0 (52)
wt = mct(1− a) yt
nt
(53)
rkt = mcta
yt
kt
(54)
dt = yt − wtnt − rkt kt−1 (55)
yt =
1(
P˜t
Pt
)−φAtkat−1n1−at (56)
bt +mt = Rt−1bt−1
Pt−1
Pt
+mt−1
Pt−1
Pt
+gt−τ ctct − τnt wtnt − τkt
(
rkt kt−1 + dt
)
− τ lt (57)
yt = ct + xt + gt (58)
(Pt)
1−φ = θ(Pt−1)1−φ + (1− θ)
(
P#t
)1−φ
(59)
(P˜t)
−φ = θ(P˜t−1)−φ+(1− θ)
(
P#t
)−φ
(60)
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where Ξt,t+k ≡ βk c
−σ
t+k
c−σt
Pt
Pt+k
τct
τct+k
and P˜t ≡
(∑N
h=1 [Pt (h)]
−φ
)− 1
φ
. Thus,
(
P˜t
Pt
)−φ
is a measure
of price dispersion.
We thus have 14 equilibrium conditions in 14 variables, {yt, ct, nt, xt, kt, mt, bt, Pt, P#t , P˜t,
wt, mct, dt, r
k
t }∞t=0. This is given the independently set monetary and fiscal policy instruments,
{Rt, gt, τ ct , τkt , τnt , τ lt}∞t=0, technology, {At}∞t=0, and initial conditions for the state variables.
9.4 Appendix 4: Decentralized equilibrium transformed (given policy in-
struments)
We now rewrite the above equilibrium conditions, first, by using inflation rates rather than
price levels, second, by writing the firm’s optimality condition (35) in recursive form and, third,
by introducing a new equation that helps us to compute expected discounted lifetime utility.
9.4.1 Variables expressed in ratios
We define three new endogenous variables, which are the gross inflation rate Πt ≡ PtPt−1 , the
auxiliary variable Θt ≡ P
#
t
Pt
, and the price dispersion index ∆t ≡
[
P˜t
Pt
]−φ
. We also find it
convenient to express the two exogenous fiscal spending policy instruments as ratios of GDP,
sgt ≡ gtyt and slt ≡
τ lt
yt
.
Thus, we can use Πt, Θt, ∆t, s
g
t , s
l
t instead of Pt, P
#
t , P˜t, gt, τ
l
t respectively.
9.4.2 Equation (52) expressed in recursive form
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), we look for a recursive representation of (52):
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
[
P#t
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k
{
P#t
Pt
− φ
(φ− 1)mct+k
Pt+k
Pt
}
= 0 (61)
We define two auxiliary endogenous variables:
z1t ≡ Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
[
P#t
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+k
P#t
Pt
(62)
z2t ≡ Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΞt,t+k
[
P#t
Pt+k
]−φ
yt+kmct+k
Pt+k
Pt
(63)
Using these two auxiliary variables, z1t and z
2
t , we come up with two new equations which enter
the dynamic system and allow a recursive representation of (61). Thus, we replace equation
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(52) above with:
z1t =
φ
(φ− 1)z
2
t (64)
where (if we also use the definitions for Πt and Θt):
z1t = Θ
−φ−1
t yt + βθEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ−1( 1
Πt+1
)−φ
z1t+1 (65)
z2t = Θ
−φ
t ytmct + βθEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ( 1
Πt+1
)1−φ
z2t+1 (66)
Thus, instead of (52), we can use (64), (65) and (66), and thus add two new endogenous
variables, z1t and z
2
t .
9.4.3 Lifetime utility written as a first-order dynamic equation
To compute social welfare, we follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) by defining a new en-
dogenous variable, Vt, whose motion is:
Vt =
c1−σt
1− σ − χn
n1+φt
1 + φ
+ χm
m1−µt
1− µ + χg
(sgt yt)
1−ζ
1− ζ + βEtVt+1 (67)
where Vt is the expected discounted lifetime utility of the household at any t.
Thus, we add equation (67), and a new endogenous variable Vt, to the equilibrium system.
9.4.4 Equations of transformed DE
Using the above, the final non-linear stochastic system is:
ct
−σ
(1 + τ ct)
= βEt
ct+1
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
) [(1− τkt+1) rkt+1 + (1− δ)] (68)
ct
−σ
Rt
1
(1 + τ ct)
= βEt
ct+1
−σ(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1
Πt+1
(69)
χmm
−µ
t −
c−σt
(1 + τ ct)
+ βEt
c−σt+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1
Πt+1
= 0 (70)
χn
nηt
c−σt
=
(1− τnt )
(1 + τ ct)
wt (71)
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + xt (72)
z1t =
φ− 1
φ
z2t (73)
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wt = mct(1− a) yt
nt
(74)
rkt = mcta
yt
kt−1
(75)
dt = yt − wtnt − rkt kt−1 (76)
yt =
1
∆t
Atk
a
t−1n
1−a
t (77)
bt +mt = Rt−1bt−1
1
Πt
+mt−1
1
Πt
+ sgt yt − τ ctct − τnt wtnt − τkt
[
rkt kt−1 + dt
]
− sltyt (78)
yt = ct + xt + s
g
t yt (79)
Π1−φt = θ + (1− θ) [ΘtΠt]1−φ (80)
∆t = (1− θ) Θ−φt + θΠφt ∆t−1 (81)
z1t = Θ
−φ−1
t yt + βθEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ−1( 1
Πt+1
)−φ
z1t+1 (82)
z2t = Θ
−φ
t ytmct + βθEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
Θt
Θt+1
)−φ( 1
Πt+1
)1−φ
z2t+1 (83)
Vt =
c1−σt
1− σ + χm
m1−µt
1− µ − χn
n1+φt
1 + φ
+ χg
(sgt yt)
1−ζ
1− ζ + βEtVt+1 (84)
There are 17 equations in 17 endogenous variables, {yt, ct, nt, xt, kt, mt, bt, Πt, Θt, ∆t, wt,
mct, dt, r
k
t , z
1
t , z
2
t , Vt}∞t=0. This is given the independently set policy instruments, {Rt, sgt , τ ct ,
τkt , τ
n
t , s
l
t}∞t=0, technology, {At}∞t=0, and initial conditions for the state variables. Recall that
{Rt, sgt , τ ct , τkt , τnt }∞t=0 follow the feedback rules specified above, while {slt}∞t=0 remains costant
and equal to its average value in the data.
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9.5 Appendix 5: The natural level of output as a policy target
In this Appendix, the policy target for output, in each period, is the level without nominal
fixities. Then, working as explained in the text (see Section 7), Table 4 changes to:
Table A.1: Optimal monetary reaction to inflation and output
and optimal fiscal reaction to debt and output
with reaction to the natural level of output
Policy
instruments
Optimal interest-rate
reaction to inflation
and output
Optimal fiscal
reaction to
debt and output
Lifetime
utility
E0V0
Rt s
g
t
φpi = 1.1
φy = 0.0337
γgl = 0.1922
γgy = 0.0992
109.2589
Rt τ
c
t
φpi = 3
φy = 0.1966
γcl = 0.2
γcy = 0.0499
109.0948
Rt τ
k
t
φpi = 3
φy = 0.3759
γkl = 0.15
γky = 0.1744
109.0752
Rt τ
n
t
φpi = 3
φy = 0.3783
γnl = 0.0092
γny = 0.0958
108.7812
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9.6 Appendix 6: Allowing for steady-state inflation
In this section, we allow for steady state, or trend, inflation (2% annually). Then, working as
explained in the text (see Section 7), Table 2 changes to:
Table A.2: Steady state solution or ”the status quo”
with 2% long-run inflation annually
Variables Solution Variables Solution Data
y 0.737742 d 0.12281 -
c 0.459145 rk 0.0395211 -
n 0.278446 z1 2.15648 -
x 0.108917 z2 1.79706 -
k 5.18651 u 0.799858 -
m 1.26165 cy 0.62 0.57
Π 1.005 by 3.4 3.4
Θ 1.01042 xy 0.15 0.18
∆ 1.00049 my 1.71 -
w 1.4723 ky 7.03 -
mc 0.833534 - - -
while Table 4 changes to:
Table A.3: Optimal monetary reaction to inflation and output
and optimal fiscal reaction to debt and output
with 2% long-run inflation annually
Policy
instruments
Optimal interest-rate
reaction to inflation
and output
Optimal fiscal
reaction to
debt and output
Lifetime
utility
E0V0
Rt s
g
t
φpi = 1.1
φy = 0.0101
γgl = 0.2251
γgy = 0.4922
108.7945
Rt τ
c
t
φpi = 2.9030
φy = 0.0001
γcl = 0.2
γcy = 0.0512
108.5390
Rt τ
k
t
φpi = 2.9811
φy = 0.0001
γkl = 0.1498
γky = 0
108.5412
Rt τ
n
t
φpi = 3
φy = 0.0525
γnl = 0.0128
γny = 0.0488
108.1972
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